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THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
IN WISCONSIN'
By

CLAUDE

D.

STOUT*

T

HE most remarkable legislation pertaining to women came in Chapter 529, Laws of 1921, now known as Section 6.015 of the Statutes.
It is directed at all discriminations against women in its purpose to
place them on an equality with the men in all respects under the law.
It reads:
"6.015. Women to have equal rights.
1. Women shall have the same rights and privileges under the
law as men
in the exercise of suffrage,
fyeedom of contract,
choice of residence for voting purposes,
jury service,
holding office,
holding and conveying property,
care and"custody of children, and
in all other respects. The various courts, executive and administrative officers shall construe the statutes where the masculine gender is used to include the feminine gender unless such construction shall deny to females the special protection and privileges
which they now enjoy for the general welfare. The courts, executive and administrative officers shall make all necessary rules and
provisions to carry out the intent and purposes of this statute.
2. Any woman drawn to serve as a juror upon her request to
the presiding judge or magistrate before the commencement of the
trial or hearing, shall be excused from the panel or venire."
Since its passage the Wisconsin Supreme Court has had occasion
to refer thereto in the Wisconsin Reports as follows:
First Wisconsin National Bank v. Milwaukee Patent Leather Co.,
179 Wis. 117, 119, 120, 121, 125, 126 and 129, a case holding a wife
liable as surety on husband's note.
Herro v. Northwestern Malleable Iron Co., 181 Wis. 198, 200, a
case holding that the husband is entitled to the same services of his
wife as theretofore.
Llbyd-McAlpine Logging Co. v. Whitefish, 188 Wis. 642, 646, a
case holding that the wife has equal rights of custody of children, as
a presumption in the law.
'This article is the third and last of a series of three articles.
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Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 203, 209, 210, 218 and 224, a case
giving a wife the right of action against the husband for his negligence
resulting in her injury.
State v. Wescott, 194 Wis. 410, 420, a case pertaining to the right
of a woman to be excused from jury service.
Sparks v. Kuss 195 Wis., 378, 398, a case holding that a wife is
liable on a partnership undertaking with the husband.
Ansorge v. City of Green Bay, 198 Wis. 325, a case pertaining to
the right of a woman to contract to be discharged as a teacher by a
school board on her marriage.
The frequent occurrence is indicative of the influence its broad
terms are exerting on the well laid rules that had theretofore defined
the status of women.
It was claimed that having attained suffrage, women were still
hedged in with discriminations not consistent with the full rights of
citizenship. Those favoring the act were not content to amend individual statutes one by one, but demanded a so-called "declaration of
rights" or a proclamation of a general "bill of rights to build on."
It may be said with truth that Wisconsin was the first state to attempt to grant absolute equality to the women. The most serious objection lies in that the enactment is blanket legislation that presents
numerous problems for future decision. That women have not been
insured the rights they desired and that the act was not politic in its
failure to accomplish the ends intended is evidenced, in a measure, by
the few decisions that have followed its passage. While trial courts
have generally followed the long established rules, still questions have
been brought squarely at issue resulting in decisions that have reached
under the cloak of protection. The question may well be asked: "Did
the women of Wisconsin benefit to the extent they were led to believe ?"
The well defined policy of the Legislative Reference Library encouraging legislation that shall express in terms so clear that there need
be no doubt either in the minds of the court or the people as to the
intent, has been set aside in this most flagrant violation of the principle that we have on record. Presumably the act amends many sections of the statutes, and what is far more, sets as naught innumerable
decisions of the courts. Just how many none of us know. In attempts
to enumerate the benefits, its most ardent defenders have repeatedly
been obliged to seek refuge within the term, "It probably does this,"
or "It probably does that." Able lawyers in the senate argued with
great force against the bill, but to no avail. Confronted with the enormous pressure brought to bear, the legislature simply "passed the buck"
to the courts in a complete abdication of its prerogative to the judicial
branch of the government, and what is far worse, to boards and com-
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missions, each of which may render widely varying interpretations.
Unless the situation is corrected by appropriate legislation, years will
elapse before the court will have opportunity to pass on the many
possible questions its broad terms present for solution. Women have
been vigorous in denouncing the conservative interpretations courts
have taken at times in matters of general welfare legislation. Still, a
bit selfishly it seems, to get what they thought they wanted they overrode the principle of distinction between the legislative and judiciary
functions of government which sound principles require should not
be confused. In one breath this act declares women shall have the
same rights and privileges "in all other respects as men," and in the
very next goes through the entire gamut in the command to the courts,
the executive, and the administrative officers to so interpret the law
"unless such construction shall deny to females the special protection
and privileges they now enjoy for the general welfare." They want
"to have the cake and eat it,"-a thing that cannot be done in the interpretation of law with impartial justice to all men and women alike.
I.

THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE

This provision added little or nothing for the lawv that permitted
women to vote only at school elections was repealed by the nineteenth
amendment to the federal constitution which became effective a-year
before and which granted suffrage to women everywhere. The revisor's bill, Chapter 15, Laws of 1921, was passed early in the session
to effectuate the federal amendment, consequently the insertion in the
equal rights act was little more than an idle gesture.
II. FR.EEDo-. OF CONTRACT
This provision is by far the most far reaching in the act. Prior
thereto, as has been shown, the married woman's right to contract had
-been enlarged to include full control of her separate property, her
separate business undertakings, her separate earnings and full authority as to family affairs when the husband failed in his duties. It seems
to be an established fact that married women are now empowered to
contract under all circumstances. This, of course, is a valuable right,
but it carries full responsibilities.
Undoubtedly Section 246.05 which applied only when the husband
failed in his duties as such has been enlarged so that the wife can
obligate herself, for example, for her physician's services and in other
similar respects where she could not theretofore be held liable.
As it is conceded that the prime intent was to place all women,
whether married or not, on an equal basis with the men in respect to
both civil and political rights, the constructions courts are placing on
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the contracts of the feme covert follow as a necessary result. One
might well ask, "What more right of contract could a married woman
ask for than what she had theretofore enjoyed." Of course the married woman was surrounded with some disabilities. Those pertaining
to her worked to her advantage as do the numerous restrictions placed
upon the husband.
Shortly after the passage of 6.015 Statutes in 1922, the construction
of the provision, "unless such construction shall deny to females the
special protection and privileges they now enjoy for the general welfare," as applied to the right to contract came in the celebrated case
of First National Bank v. Jahn, 179 Wisconsin, page 117. The court
frankly stated at page 125 that "freedom of contract means what it
says and that women shall be as free as men to make personal contracts." On page 126 Chief Justice Rosenberry points out that the
distinction between the disabilities of the common law applying to the
feme covert the law aimed to remove were separate and apart from
those rights and privileges which women have enjoyed by various statutory enactments under the general welfare and police powers. The
dictum may be considered as expressing doubt as to the wisdom of
such legislation; however, the decision goes far in holding:
First. That absolute equality of rights and privileges before the
law does not destroy the established principle of sex as constituting
a classification for laws pertaining to health or morals, etc., and
Second. That the right of contract carries with it the corresponding liabilities.
Hence, the long line of decisions holding that a married woman could
not be a surety on her husband's note was over-ruled. Consequently,
for the first time, a married woman was obliged to pay the note she
had endorsed for her husband as an accommodation endorser, even
though her separate estate received no benefit therefrom. What is
more, the decision means that, in such case, the married woman is
now subject to liability on a deficiency judgment.
Another most important decision followed in Sparks v. Kuss, 195
Wisconsin, page 378, which held, for the first time, that a married
woman can enter into a partnership undertaking with her own husband and consequently be held liable for the debts of such a partnership. The decision is far reaching in that in the early case of Merchants National Bank v. Raymond, 27 Wisconsin, page 569, the established rule that had been consistently followed was that a married
woman who possessed a separate estate could engage in a partnership
venture with a person other than her husband, but that in order to
preserve the control of her separate estate apart from that of her
husband, as was the obvious intent of the separate property act, it
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followed that a wife could not be permitted to suffer the consequences
of liability of a partnership with her husband. Married women now
need to exercise great care in making' such agreements. They will not
relish the collection of judgments from their separate estates resulting
from the poor business management of husbands with whom they have
been inveigled into partnership ventures. The decision is loaded with
dynamite.
Antenuptial agreements have been favored where elderly people
contemplating marriage have been permitted, before doing so, to enter
into agreements respecting their property rights. Having legally done
so, the court has not permitted the wife thereafter to alter the settlement. Under the full power to contract, it is believed that the court
will, when called upon to decide, hold that a wife may, for the first
time in this state, during her marriage, contract freely with her husband in respect to such agreements.
III.

CHOICE OF RESIDENCE FOR VOTING PURPOSES

The phrase "for voting purposes" 'was added to the original bill
as an amendment, and of course permits married women to vote in
the precinct where she resides regardless of the fact that her husband
may reside and vote in another. It was, therefore, a very necessary
and proper provision.
It was evidently the intent of the legislature to limit the right the
women desired to have to a word in fixing the family domicile to
apply to her convenience in the exercise of suffrage. It, was, however,
believed for a time by some that under the "in all other respects" provision the wife possessed a right to participate with the husband in
its selection. But in the late case of Kruger v. Groth, 190 Wisconsin,
page 387, decided in 1926, the court went far in holding that "although the homestead is for the benefit of the family, yet, as between
the husband and wife he has the right of selection and the power of
abandonment." The Chief Justice joined with two other judges in a
vigorous dissenting opinion and the decision may not always remain
the law. Although the decision made no mention of the rights of the
wife under the statute under discussion, nevertheless, it has a direct
Jbearing thereon. It would seem, therefore, that if anything the husband has gained rather than lost as 'to his rights as to the family
domicile.
IV.

JURY SERVICE

All doubts that existed under existing. laws and the nineteenth
amendment to the federal constitution as to the right of Women to
serve on a jury were, of course, removed by this provision. Modem
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women keenly resented the discrimination in not being subject to call
for jury service. However, it should be noted that Section 255.02
enumerates more than thirty classes as exempt from jury service.
Therefore, the discrimination cannot be said to have been aimed exclusively at the women. In the celebrated debate between Zona Gale
and Hon. A. E. Matheson before the Wisconsin State Bar Association
in 1922, the argument advanced by the affirmative that women admitted to the bar were not permitted to sit on a jury merely because
they were women entirely overlooked the fact that all lawyers are
exempt from such service.
V. HOLDING OFFICE
Here again was an unnecessary provision as the revisor's bill, Chapter 15, Laws of 1921, passed in March, pursuant to the nineteenth
amendment to the federal constitution antedated this duplication.
Women are now eligible to any office and we now even have women
sheriffs. However, under the police regulations of Section 13.13, Subsection 1, the legislature may employ in its service only male persons,
due to the unfitness of its unreasonable hours for the employment of
women. To be consistent with the spirit of the protective labor provisions, the law makers saw fit to exclude the women from its service.
Furthermore the legislature is a separate and distinct department of
government having a constitutional prerogative to regulate its own
functions with which other departments of the government are loath
to interfere. In seeking to force down this barrier the women did not
benefit their cause.
VI. HOLDING AND CONVEYING PROPERTY
It is difficult to conceive what more as to property rights married
women could ask for than they already have had. No restrictions have
ever existed as to the property rights of the feme sole.
It is claimed that Section 247.31 which permits courts in divorce
actions to appoint a trustee of funds awarded the wife for her maintenance and the maintenance and education of minor children is a
discrimination in that no similar provision exists as to the husband.
The argument is far fetched for property is not awarded to the husband out of the separate property of the wife except in the rare instance provided by Section 247.27 where the custody of children is
awarded to the husband and then only for the benefit of her own
children. The court may do so where it is evident that the wife does
not possess sufficient business experience, and furthermore, her trustee is obliged to give his bond for the performance of his duties as to
the funds to be expended for her benefit.
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VII. CARE AND CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
Chapter 147, Laws of 1921, published in April, some months prior
to the statute under discussion, amended Section 3964 to confer joint
guardianship rights as follows:
"The father and mother of the minor, if living together, and if living
apart, then eithier as the court may determine for the best interests of
the minor, and in case of ------ the death of either parent the survivor thereof ------ shall be entitled to the custody of the minor and
to the care of his education."
Prior to the amendment, it read:
"The father of the minor, if living, and in case of his death, the
mother, while she remains unmarried," etc.
It was claimed that the former statute was a discrimination directed
against the mother. However, in Jensen v. Jensen, 168 Wisconsin, page
502, decided in 1919, Chief Justice Winslow said:
"The paramount right of the father to the custody of his children,
which was recognized by the common law and by the words of our
statute, has become the merest prima facie right, which yields readily
when it is shown to be best for the child."
The opinion cited the early cases of Wesch v. Welch, 33 Wisconsin,
page 534 and Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wisconsin, page 44, and further said:
"The welfare of the child is now the controlling consideration; and
with regard to children of tender years, especially girls, preference will
ordinarily be given to the mother, other things being equal and she
not being unfit."
Thus long ago the rule of the court has consistently given the preference to the mother wherever the interests of the child were promoted thereby.
In Jensen v. Jensen the former husband sought to have the custody
of his minor child taken from his divorced wife on the ground that
she was then living with a man under an illegal marriage. However,
the court refused to permit him to do so as it was not shown that her
unlawful act manifested a depravity of mind or moral unfitness, and
it appeared the child was well cared for and had a good home.
Equal care and custody opens the door as to whether the earnings
of children belong alone to the father as theretofore, or to the father
and mother jointly. The further serious question of practice follows
in case the father is not alone entitled to such earnings whether in
actions for loss of such services both the father and mother must join
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in the action and on recovery to whom the same belongs. If the argument that the mother is now entitled to share in the earnings of the
children has merit, then it must follow in view of her enlarged rights
to custody that she should be obliged to participate somewhat in the
duty of the support of the children.
Heretofore, the father having been entitled to the custody was,
in some instances, correspondingly liable for the torts of his minor
children, which of course, is not the general rule. The following is
an illustration of this exception. In the case of Halverson v. Noker,
60 Wisconsin, page 511, a father was held liable for damages resulting
from shouting and firing of toy pistols by his children on his premises
which frightened the team of the plaintiff being driven along the highway. It mattered not that the mother may have supplied the mischievous machines and utterly failed to exercise any restraint whatever
over the mischievous propensities of her offspring; nevertheless, the
damages were sought from the father. Now, with equal right of custody, why should not a father who is absent from home and has no
participation in supplying the mischievous implements be permitted to
plead that the liability should be shifted from his to the shoulders of
the mother?
Section 319.04 does seem to give the husband superior rights to
guardianship in that:
"The father of every legitimate child, if living, and in case of his
death the mother of such child may, by last will in writing, appoint a
guardian." (See Sec. 10, Chapter 80, R. S. 1849.)
It may now be contended that a mother may, by last will, transfer
her equal custody to a person other than her husband on her death.
Chapter 106, Statutes, permits a minor over sixteen years of age
to be apprenticed under the circumstances therein provided and that
such indentures shall first be signed by the father, if living, and if
the father be dead, or legally incapable of giving consent, then the
mother may do so. It is claimed that this provision is superceded by
the equal custody clause. If so, opportunity is afforded for family dissentions due to the divided parental authority not heretofore permitted.
VIII.

IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS

The term above is so indefinite that mere speculation as to its many
possible consequences are of little value. However, there are a few
statutory provisions that may be considered as coming within its purview.
Section 247.20 permits the court, in its discretion, to allow the wife,
on divorce, where there are no children, to resume her maiden name
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or that of a former husband. It may now even be contended that the
court is required to restore to the wife her maiden nameunder all
circumstances. If so, what names will be taken by the children? If
the custody of part are given to the mother and others to the father,
are each group to take the names of the parents to whom their custody
has been awarded? Of course, the ancient custom requiring the wife
to assume the name of the husband "for better or for worse" is a
relic of antiquity. Modern emancipation of women has brought complications that even the companionate marriage cannot solve. If the
"all other respects" provision is given its broadest construction, then
all common law rights are swept aside-even the ancient and hallowed theory of dower.
Regardless of the decision in Kruger v. Groth supra, this clause
seems to leave open some question as to the rights of domicile which
the wife may, in some instances, have acquired. At common law, the
husband was of necessity given the selection of the family domicile,
and if the wife refused to follow, without sufficient cause, such action
constituted desertion. However, the iule has not been absolute and
has been tempered with justice and mercy for the husband could not
unreasonably jeopardize the health of the wife by a change of domicile
and thereafter claim cause of divorce on grounds of desertion, due to
her refusal to jeopardize her health in following him to a new home.
Furthermore, when cause of divorce existed, the wife is permitted to
establish a separate residence.
In the case of Rockwell v. Estate of Robinson, 158 Wisconsin, page
319, a husband, on his own behalf, made a contract to do certain work
with the help of his wife. It was held that the amount due therefore
belonged to and as recoverable by him and was not "individual earnings" of the wife within the purview of the separate earnings act.
It was contended without success. that the husband could not alone
sue for such services. Under the terms of Section 6.015 it may now
be a debatable question whether Rockwell v. Robinson is the law.
Possibly a husband cannot even now make such a contract.
Section 49.02 and following sections provide for relief and support
for the poor pertaining to legal settlements and how the same may be
obtained, the purpose being to determine when and under what circumstances the burden of caring for the poor may shift from one
municipality to another. Subsection 1 provides that:
"A married woman shall always follow and have the settlement of
her husband if he have any within the state; otherwise her own at
the time of marriage, and if she then had any settlement it shall not
be lost or suspended by the marriage. . ." etc., and Subsection 5, "and
every married woman whose husband has no settlement in this state
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who shall have resided one year in any town, village, or city in this
state shall thereby gain a settlement therein."
Surely the foregoing have given the wife all that could be desired.
It seems that in spite of the "in all other respects" phrase in view
of the decision in the First National Bank v. Jahn case that no greater
interpretations will be placed than the legislature intended. It is, of
course, far fetched to contend that the well established sections as to
dower and curtesy are modified; nevertheless, if women are now equal
in all respects, why should not their separate property be subjected to
the same provisions and, on divorce, the same rules of division apply
to them as apply to the husbands?
It may be that the criminal punishment for abandonment of minor
children may hereafter be construed to apply with equal force to the
mother who joins with her husband in participation in the crime provided in Section 351.30.
Section 319.14 permits the income of property of a minor who has
a father living to be used for his maintenance and education where
his needs are more expensive than the father can afford. It may be
argued that the separate property of the mother of such an infant may
now come within the purview of this section in that mother's separate
property should be used for such purpose before that of the infant
can be disturbed.
If equal in all other respects, why should Section 238.01 be permitted to go on allowing married women over eighteen years of age
to make their wills, while the male must wait until his full majority?
Absolute equality certainly permits of such a contention.
Under the First National Bank v. Jahn case the distinction in the
sexes as to the ages at which marriage may take place should' be considered as coming within the exception pointed out in the opinion for
the general welfare.
Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wisconsin, page 202, opened the theretofore
closed door to permit a married woman to bring and maintain an action
against her own husband for injuries to her person proximately caused
by his negligence. Of course, such actions are usually confined to the
recovery of damages from insurance companies in automobile accidents. Nevertheless, the rule permits either the wife or husband to
sue the other in tort actions as was pointed out in the vigorous dissenting opinion participated in by three justices. The decision which
placed a new interpretation on Chapter 99, Laws of 1881, contained
the significant statement that
"the rigor of the common law has been greatly relaxed, and both
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by decision and statute married wonien have gradually attained aplace
of equality with the husband in the marital status,"
and that Section 6.015 has
"modified the rights of the husband and wife as they existed at
common law and that it was designed to place them on a basis of
equality before the law not only in the particulars mentioned but in
all other respects."
The fears of the dissenting judges as to the right of a child to sue
the parent in such cases were somewhat laid at rest in Wick v. Wick,
192 Wisconsin, page 260, which held, on grounds of public policy,
that
"an infant under fourteen years could not be permitted to bring an
action against a parent for personal injury resulting from the negligence of the parent in an automobile accident."
In Wallace v. Newdale Furniture Company, 188 Wisconsin, page
205, a young married woman, twenty years of age, became ambitious
and, without the approval of her husband, purchased furniture on a
conditional sales contract, gave her notes in payment, opened up a
rooming house, conducted the venture herself, and collected all the
income from the undertaking. The venture was not a success and the
couple separated. She then tendered back the furniture in repudiation of her contract on the claim that she was a minor and demanded
back the money paid. The vendor thereupon brought suit against the
husband on the theory that she became his agent by operation of law
to the extent that he became liable for the payment for the property.
In the denial of recovery, Justice Jones inade the significant statement
that "If husbands may thus be held answerable unawares for the business speculations of their wives, there would be some ground for the
assertion which has been made in jest, that the next great revolution
must be by married men to obtain their rights." This dictum of the
court would seem to indicate that it is not disposed to favor a wholesale extension of rights and privileges women may desire to*assume
they have attained through so-called equality legislation. Although no
direct reference was made to the equal rights act under discussion,
nevertheless, the language of the court is very pertinent to the modernized status of the wife.
In Herro v. Northwestern Malleable Iron -Co., 181 Wisconsin, page
198, a husband brought an action for loss of services resulting from
the negligence of the defendant. The amazing' argument was advanced by counsel for the defendant that under Section 6.015 the
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husband could no longer recover for such services on the theory that
under the equal rights act a married woman was entitled to all her
earnings. This wife had been of exceptional assistance to her husband in the operation of his confectionery bu iness besides performing the usual household duties. The court, however, ruled that Section 2343, now Section 246.05, controlled the situation, and restated
the statute aforesaid. As a result the husband has the same right to
recover for the loss of such of the services of the wife as are performed in the usual household duties and in his business as theretofore. Furthermore, any claims that, under the equality statute, the
right of the wife to her services had been enlarged or that, per chance,
she had acquired any right to recover from her husband for such
services as had been performed for him were set at rest. The decision
is far reaching because the wife is relieved of none of the duties she
owes to her husband and family as fixed by the separate earnings
act of 1872. It may be said that when a man has such a wife he has
something, and when he loses her, he has lost something, as the court
properly concluded in awarding him the sum of $7,500.00.
In Ansorge v. City of Green Bay, 198 Wisconsin, page 325, the
action of school officials in discharging a teacher on her marriage was
held not to contravene the provisions of Section 6.015, she having
entered into a contract with full knowledge of the rule and signed
the same providing for discharge on her marriage and notice of the
termination of the employment. Clearly, it could not be expected that
the plain terms of a written contract could be avoided under any
rights assumed to be given under the equality statute in view of the
broad powers vested in school boards in the employment of its teachers.
In Aaby v. Citizens National Bank, 197 Wisconsin, page 56, it became necessary to over-rule a part of the holding in Dupont v. Jonet,
165 Wisconsin, page 554, in erasing another of the time-worn rules
of the common law as to which, due to seeming conflict of decisions,
some doubt existed. It was believed that where the title to personal
property was jointly taken by husband and wife, an estate by the entireties existed under which neither could convey his or her interest
apart from the other as was held in Dupont v. Jonet, supra. Under
the reinforced provisions of Section 6.015 and decisions thereunder,
it is now clear that "the estate by the entirity no longer exists either
in real or personal property" resulting in the holding that a husband
may now assign his interest in such a joint fund, in payment of his
debt, without the signature of the wife. The decision so held, regardless of the fact that the fund resulted from the sale of a homestead, which under Section 272.20 could be held intact for a period of
two years with the intent of acquiring another therewith on the theory
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that if a wife can voluntarily dispose of her interest in such an estate, the husband could likewise do so. The husband, it seems, as well
as the wife, has acquired additional rights under "equality legislation."
It should be noted in view of recent legislation "to remove discriminations against females" that Chapter 4, Revised Statutes of 1849,
contained the same provision found in Subsection 2 of Section 370.01,
i.e., "Every word importing the masculine gender only may extend
and be applied to males as well as females." Consequently statutory
construction has never discriminated between the sexes.
In concluding, brief reference is made to the proposed amendment
to the federal constitution the National Women's Party advocate that
"Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States
and every place subject to its jurisdiction." The founders of the federal plan of government wisely granted definite powers and guaranteed to the people those not therein expressly provided for otherwise.
If the women are not to be denied and if this type of legislation must
come, it is far better that it come through steps taken in recognition
of the sovereign right guaranteed to the states to regulate their own
affairs in such matters rather than through federal interference. The
reader is referred to pages 192 to 195 inclusive of the proceedings of
the Wisconsin State Bar Association for 1922, where the ablest students of jurisprudence in the country expressed grave fears of the
dire results likely to follow such an amendment.
Equality of women is not new to the age of the present for in the
ancient civilization of Egypt, women, as in matters of divorce, had
acquired rights superior to those of the male. As was said in the first
article of this series, "the end is not yet," nor has the half been told.

